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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
 
Anthony Hayes ) Docket No.  2018-08-1204 
 ) 
v. ) State File No. 56539-2018 
 ) 
Elmington Property Management, et al. ) 
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 
Compensation Claims ) 
Deana C. Seymour, Judge )
 
Affirmed and Remanded 
 
On February 7, 2020, the pro se employee filed a notice of appeal indicating he was 
appealing the trial court’s “Order Denying Employee’s Motion for Recusal.”  The notice 
of appeal stated that the judge was citing “wrongful/codes laws” that do not apply to the 
issues raised for the purpose of aiding the employer; that the judge was allowing 
“unskilled doctors” who could not “treat or properly diagnose” the employee; that the 
judge was “tampering [with] and concealing orders . . . to prevent [the employee]” from 
obtaining “his rightful relief”; and that the judge “has been automatically disqualified 
pursuant to Title 28 [U.S.C. section 455(a)].”  Neither party timely filed a brief on appeal.  
Having carefully reviewed and considered the record, and having noted that the employee 
presented no evidence to the trial court to support his positions and no argument on 
appeal addressing how the trial court allegedly erred in denying his motion for recusal, 
we affirm the trial court’s February 7, 2020 order denying the employee’s motion for 
recusal.  We deem the appeal to be frivolous, exercise our discretion not to award 
attorneys’ fees and expenses, and remand the case. 
 
Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding 
Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge Pele I. Godkin joined. 
 
Anthony Hayes, Memphis, Tennessee, employee-appellant, pro se 
 
Stephen P. Miller, Memphis, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, Elmington Property 
Management 
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Memorandum Opinion1 
 
 This is the third interlocutory appeal in this case.  It was filed by Anthony Hayes 
(“Employee”) following the trial court’s denial of his motion seeking the recusal of the 
trial judge.  While a recitation of the entire history of the litigation is not necessary to 
address the current appeal, we have set out portions of the factual and procedural 
background for context. 
 
Employee was working in the course and scope of his employment with 
Elmington Property Management (“Employer”) in July 2018 when he fell, allegedly 
injuring his left knee, left arm, right hand, and head.  His claim for workers’ 
compensation benefits was accepted as compensable, and he began treating with Dr. 
David Deneka, an orthopedic specialist.  In September 2018, Dr. Deneka reported that 
Employee had reached maximum medical improvement for his work-related injuries and 
would retain no permanent medical impairment associated with his injuries. 
 
 Thereafter, Employee complained that he had not received medical treatment for  
neck and back pain that he related to his fall at work.  He filed a petition seeking 
additional medical benefits, and, because he had been terminated from his employment, 
he also sought temporary disability benefits.  Following an expedited hearing, the trial 
court concluded Employee had offered credible testimony regarding his need for 
additional medical treatment for the injuries related to his fall but did not present 
sufficient evidence of his entitlement to temporary disability benefits.  The court ordered 
Employer to schedule an appointment with Dr. Deneka but denied Employee’s request 
for temporary disability benefits.  Employee appealed the trial court’s denial of his 
request for temporary disability benefits, and we affirmed the trial court’s order and 
remanded the case.  See Hayes v. Elmington Prop. Mgmt., Inc., No. 2018-08-1204, 2019 
TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 49, at *1-2 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 3, 
2019). 
 
 Employee subsequently returned to Dr. Deneka.  While the record of that visit as 
well as documents addressing subsequent communications between Employer’s counsel 
and Dr. Deneka are not included in the present record, it appears from the trial court’s 
November 4, 2019 order that Dr. Deneka could not address Employee’s complaints 
because “he does not treat neck and back issues.”  As a result, Employer provided a panel 
of physicians from which Employee selected Dr. Mark Harriman, a physician at 
OrthoSouth. 
 
                                                 
1 “The Appeals Board may, in an effort to secure a just and speedy determination of matters on appeal and 
with the concurrence of all judges, decide an appeal by an abbreviated order or by memorandum opinion, 
whichever the Appeals Board deems appropriate, in cases that are not legally and/or factually novel or 
complex.”  Appeals Bd. Prac. & Proc. § 1.3. 
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Employee was seen by Dr. Harriman on October 8, 2019.  The record of that visit 
reflects the appointment was for an independent medical evaluation at the request of 
Employer’s counsel rather than for treatment.  It also reflects that Dr. Harriman obtained 
a history from Employee, examined him, and reviewed numerous medical records.  It 
noted Employee had a history of “a back injury from a motor vehicle accident years ago,” 
and indicated Employee’s “story had changed considerably” concerning his neck and 
back.  The report stated Employee “said that his initial neck and back problems were very 
minor, and he did not think anything of them until they started bothering him when Dr. 
Deneka returned him back to work.”  Further, the report stated that Dr. Harriman “asked 
him again specifically when he had started having neck and back problems,” and that 
Employee “went on to tell him that he had a second fall, unrelated to his on the job 
injury, in September 2018 going home from a store,” and that “things got worse then and 
he sought care for his neck and back through the [Veterans Administration].”  Two days 
after Employee’s evaluation by Dr. Harriman, the doctor signed an amendment to his 
report stating, “[s]pecifically, I can state with greater than 50% assurance that 
[Employee’s] complaints of lumbar and cervical neck pain are not related to his on-the-
job injury of July 27, 2018.” 
 
On October 25, 2019, Employee filed a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions in 
which he asserted that Dr. Harriman would not treat him and told him the October 8 visit 
was for an evaluation only.  Employee’s motion stated that Dr. Harriman was “in the 
same office” as Dr. Deneka and asserted that certain statements included in Dr. 
Harriman’s report were “not true based on what [Employee] told” Dr. Harriman. 
Employee’s motion requested that he be provided with medical treatment for his neck 
and back, and that Employer be sanctioned for its failure to provide medical treatment as 
previously ordered by the trial court.  Employer’s response to the motion addressed the 
report of Employee’s October 8 evaluation with Dr. Harriman and Dr. Harriman’s 
amendment indicating he did not think that Employee’s back and neck pain were related 
to his work injury.  Employer asserted in its response that Employee’s back and neck 
complaints were not compensable and that Employee’s motion to compel and for 
sanctions should be denied. 
 
On November 4, 2019, the trial court granted Employee’s motion, finding that 
Employer was obligated to provide Employee with a panel of physicians for treatment of 
Employee’s back and neck complaints.  The order noted that Employee had returned to 
Dr. Deneka, who “does not treat neck and back issues,” and that Employee was later 
evaluated by Dr. Harriman who concluded that Employee’s “neck and back complaints 
were less than fifty percent related to the work injury.”  However, the court determined 
that Employer “should have provided [Employee] a panel from which he could select a 
physician to address his head and neck complaints rather than providing only an 
independent medical examiner.”  The court ordered Employer to provide a panel of 
physicians to “evaluate [Employee’s] head and neck conditions” within ten days, adding 
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that Employer’s failure to do so would “result in referral to the Compliance Program for 
investigation and possible assessment of penalties.” 
 
Three days later, Employer filed a motion requesting the court to reconsider its 
November 4, 2019 order.  Employer supported its motion with a document electronically 
signed by Dr. Harriman on November 5, 2019.  It stated that “[t]he report on [Employee] 
was improperly titled as an Independent Medical Evaluation,” and that “[i]n fact, the 
report should have been titled as a medical opinion with option to treat should treatment 
be required and related to the alleged work incident.” 
 
On November 18, 2019, Employee filed a “Motion for Reconsideration for 
Contempt and for Sanctions.”  In his motion, he did not address Employer’s motion to 
reconsider the November 4 order; rather, Employee asserted statements similar to those 
included in his earlier motion for contempt and for sanctions, adding that Dr. Harriman 
“wrote [an] evaluation based on . . . information received from the Employer.”  He 
alleged he was unable to get additional treatment, and that “because of the time involved 
his injury [had] gotten worse due to malpractice of both doctor[]s.” 
 
On November 20, 2019, the trial court granted Employer’s motion to reconsider 
the November 4 order.  The court determined that Employer had satisfied its obligation to 
provide Employee “with a proper panel under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
204 and is not required to provide him with another panel.”  The court’s order does not 
reflect whether it conducted a hearing on the motion, and the order did not address 
Employee’s November 18 motion.  On December 4, 2019, Employee filed a notice of 
appeal of the court’s November 20 order, which was not timely.  As a result, we 
dismissed the appeal on December 5, 2019, and remanded the case.  On December 6, 
2019, Employee filed a “Demand for Reconsideration of Appeal,” citing the Tennessee 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, neither of 
which apply to us.  We treated Employee’s filing as a motion to reconsider the dismissal 
of the appeal, which we denied by order filed on December 9. 
 
A scheduling order was subsequently filed in the trial court on January 14, 2020, 
which set dates for discovery and other procedural matters and a June 17, 2020 trial date.  
On January 22, 2020, Employee filed numerous documents in the trial court that included 
a Sworn Complaint for Shelby County Government, which identified nine separate 
individuals, offices, or other entities alleged to be “violators,” including the trial judge.  
Several documents were filed as “Exhibits” to the Sworn Complaint, including 
Employee’s “Request for Recusal of [the Trial Judge] & Ethical Complaint,” which was 
addressed to the Chief Judge of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims and to the 
Tennessee Attorney General.  The “Exhibits” to the Sworn Complaint also included a 
“Complaint Against Judge Under Code of Judicial Conduct” that was purportedly filed 
with the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct.  Among other numerous allegations in 
these documents, Employee alleged that the trial judge conspired with other members of 
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the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to prevent him from timely receiving the court’s 
orders, falsified a court order, and proceeded with a scheduling hearing over his 
objection. 
 
The trial court addressed Employee’s motion for recusal in its February 7, 2020 
order.  The court determined Employee had presented no evidence of prejudice or bias, 
and that there was no reasonable basis to question the judge’s impartiality.  In addition, 
the court concluded that Employee had not complied with Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-
02-21-.18(3) (2019), which requires an affidavit to be filed with a motion to recuse 
setting out the factual and legal grounds supporting the recusal.  Based upon Employee’s 
failure to present supporting evidence and his failure to file an appropriate affidavit, the 
trial court denied his recusal motion. 
 
Employee timely filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s February 7 order.  In 
the notice of appeal, Employee asserts that the trial judge cited “wrongful codes [and] 
laws that [do] not apply to the issues being raised to [enable] [Employer] to continue to 
discriminate and wrongfully deny[] claimant benefits.”  Further, Employee’s notice of 
appeal alleged the following: 
 
[The trial judge] is completely giving unskilled doctors who can not [sic] 
treat or properly [diagnose] claimant.  [T]ampering [with] and concealing 
orders of the Courts to prevent this Appellant [from obtaining] his rightful 
relief from the courts.  [The trial judge] has been [a]utomatically 
[d]isqualified pursuant to TITLE 28 USC sect. 455(a). 
 
As an initial matter, we note that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) applies to judges sitting on 
federal courts and is not applicable to judges of the Court of Workers’ Compensation 
Claims.  The rules governing the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims provide the 
requirements necessary for a party to request that a judge recuse himself or herself.  
Specifically, the rules provide that 
 
[a]ny party seeking disqualification or recusal of a judge must do so by 
timely filing a written motion.  The motion must be supported by an 
affidavit under oath or a [Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure] Rule 72 
declaration on personal knowledge and by other appropriate materials.  The 
motion must state with specificity all factual and legal grounds supporting 
disqualification of the judge and must affirmatively state that it is not being 
presented for improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or increase the cost of litigation. 
 
Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.18(3). 
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As the trial court observed, Employee failed to file the documentation required to 
support his motion for recusal.  Although the documents Employee filed on January 22, 
2020, included a “Shelby County Government Sworn Complaint” with Employee’s 
notarized signature, none of the documents affirmatively stated that Employee’s motion 
was “not being presented for improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or increase the cost of litigation” as required by the above rule. 
 
 All litigants, whether proceeding pro se or not, are entitled to have their disputes 
heard and decided by fair and impartial judges.  This right has been described as “one of 
the core tenets of our jurisprudence,” and “it goes without saying that a trial before a 
biased or prejudiced fact finder is a denial of due process.”  Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2001).  Thus, judges must act “at all times in a manner 
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”  Id. 
 
In evaluating a motion to recuse, the Tennessee Supreme Court has provided the 
following guidance: 
 
A motion to recuse should be granted if the judge has any doubt as to his or 
her ability to preside impartially in the case.  However, because perception 
is important, recusal is also appropriate when a person of ordinary prudence 
in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would 
find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.  Thus, even 
when a judge believes that he or she can hear a case fairly and impartially, 
the judge should grant the motion to recuse if the judge’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.  Hence, the test is ultimately an objective one 
since the appearance of bias is as injurious to the integrity of the judicial 
system as actual bias.  However, the mere fact that a judge has ruled 
adversely to a party or witness in a prior judicial proceeding is not grounds 
for recusal. . . . If the rule were otherwise, recusal would be required as a 
matter of course since trial courts necessarily rule against parties and 
witnesses in every case, and litigants could manipulate the impartial[it]y 
issue for strategic advantage, which the courts frown upon. 
 
Id. at 564-65 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) 
 
In addition, the law is clear that the party seeking recusal bears the burden of 
proof.  Runyon v. Runyon, No. W2013-02651-COA-T10B-CV, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
184, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2014).  Specifically, a party challenging the 
impartiality of a judge “must come forward with some evidence that would prompt a 
reasonable, disinterested person to believe that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned.”  Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002).  We 
review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to recuse de novo.  See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 
2.01. 
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 Here, contrary to Employee’s assertions concerning federal statutes, 
disqualification of the trial judge is not automatic.  Rather, consistent with longstanding 
Tennessee jurisprudence, a trial judge, when faced with a motion to recuse, must decide 
whether he or she can preside over a case with impartiality and without the appearance of 
partiality.  Unless Employee presented sufficient evidence to establish that the trial judge 
demonstrated prejudice or partiality in his case or bias against him, or that a reasonable 
person would conclude the judge was not impartial, the judge was not required to grant 
his motion for recusal. 
 
Employee’s submissions in the trial court included allegations that the trial judge 
discriminated against him, falsified orders, and conspired to keep orders from timely 
being sent to him.  Employee asserted that, by entering the November 20 order granting 
Employer’s motion to reconsider the November 4 order, the judge “did a complete turn 
about [to] give the Opposing Party unlawful comfort and less[e]n her [November 4] 
order.”  He asserted the trial judge discriminated against him “because [he was] not 
represented by [counsel],” and that the judge “attempted to change the nature of the 
Orders and the proceedings, to protect [Employer] from the SANCTIONS [in the 
November 4 order], so that an alleged ‘PRO SE’ would not be down as winning over a 
BAR ATTORNEY.”  Further, he alleged that the court’s November 4 order “was never 
meant for [his] [e]yes,” and that had he not called the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, 
he would not have known that the November 4 order existed.  He asserted these 
circumstances amount to “CONCEALMENT AND INTENTIONAL OBSTRUCTION 
OF A COURT ORDER.” 
 
As noted above, the November 4 order obligated Employer to provide a new panel 
within ten days, and the order stated that Employer’s failure to comply with the order 
would “result in referral to the Compliance Program for investigation and possible 
penalties.”  Among the many allegations included in Employee’s recusal motion, he 
asserted that Employer failed to provide a panel within ten days as stated in the 
November 4 order, and that the November 20 order was entered to protect Employer 
from an investigation and possible penalties upon the referral of Employer to the 
Compliance Program.  However, Employee did not address Employer’s November 7 
motion to reconsider in his recusal motion.  On November 18 he filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration for Contempt and for Sanctions, but he did not address Employer’s 
November 7 motion in this submission either. It is unclear from the record whether or 
when Employee received Employer’s November 7 motion.  However, the motion 
included a November 7 certificate indicating Employee was served by email and first 
class mail. 
 
The record includes certificates of service completed by the Clerk of the Court of 
Workers’ Compensation Claims stating that the court’s November 4 and November 20 
orders were sent to Employee by certified mail and by regular mail.  The certificate of 
service of the trial court’s subsequent Scheduling Order states the order was sent to 
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Employee by certified mail and by email, and the certificate for the court’s February 7, 
2020 order denying Employee’s recusal motion states that order was sent to Employee by 
certified mail, regular mail, and email.  Employee’s submissions state that he did not 
receive the November 20 order until December 3, which was the last date that Employee 
could timely file a notice to appeal the November 20 order; and his December 4 notice of 
appeal was untimely.  It was not the responsibility of the trial judge or the Clerk of the 
Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims to ensure that the November 4 and November 
20 orders, which were sent by certified and regular mail to Employee on the day they 
were filed, were received and acted upon by Employee in sufficient time for him to file 
an appeal. 
 
Having thoroughly reviewed and considered the record, we agree with the trial 
court’s determination that there was “no action of bias against [Employee] and ‘no 
reasonable basis’ to question the [trial judge’s] impartiality.”  We agree with the trial 
court’s determination that Employee “failed to come forward with evidence that a 
reasonable, disinterested person would believe puts the Judge’s impartiality into 
question.”  Except for Employee’s own assertions, he did not present evidence of bias, 
evidence of an appearance of bias, or evidence of a lack of impartiality. 
 
 Moreover, there is no evidence that the trial judge falsified any orders as alleged 
by Employee.  While it is not clear from Employee’s submissions whether he is referring 
to the court’s November 20 order as being “falsified,” we presume he was, as the order 
effectively negated the November 4 order.  However, upon the filing of Employer’s 
motion asking the court to reconsider its November 4 order, the trial court considered the 
clarification from Dr. Harriman stating that his examination was not an independent 
medical examination with no option for treatment as the doctor had earlier indicated.  
Based upon Dr. Harriman’s clarification, the trial court determined that Employer 
provided Employee with a proper panel and was not required to provide another panel.  
We discern no evidence of bias, prejudice, or partiality in the trial court’s determination. 
 
 We also note that Employee did not timely file a brief supporting his contention 
that the trial court erred in denying his motion to recuse.  See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 
0800-02-22-.02(2) (2018).  He did, however, submit a document to the Clerk of the Court 
of Workers’ Compensation Claims on April 10, 2020, titled as follows: 
 
Objections & Exceptions to the Respondent’s Intentional Deception & 
Misrepresentation to the Courts, & the Ombudsman and/or Rep. Derrick 
Shorter and the EEOC; Entering Evidence of Concealed Order and Deceit 
Played on Plaintiff by the Court’s Office of the Clerks & Respondents: 
Rebuttal to Respondent’s Position Statement. 
 
Employee’s brief on appeal was due on or before March 6, 2020, making the document 
he submitted to the trial court on April 10 five weeks late if it was intended to be his brief 
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on appeal.  The document was not accompanied by a motion to accept a late-filed brief, 
and we therefore decline to consider it.  Moreover, it addresses Employee’s assertion that 
he was wrongfully terminated, an issue not within the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Workers’ Compensation Claims, and it does not provide any legal argument describing 
how the trial court erred in denying his recusal motion.  “It is not the role of the courts, 
trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her.”  
Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 
2010)).  In short, Employee failed to properly support his recusal motion with an affidavit 
as required by the applicable rules, he failed to present sufficient evidence that the trial 
judge is biased against him or that the judge cannot preside over the case with 
impartiality, and he failed to present evidence suggesting that a reasonable observer 
would question the judge’s impartiality. 
 
Finally, we find Employee’s appeal to be frivolous.  “A frivolous appeal is one 
that . . . had no reasonable chance of succeeding,”  Adkins v. Studsvik, Inc., No. E2014-
00444-SC-R3-WC, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 588, at *30 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel July 
21, 2015), or one that is devoid of merit or brought solely for delay.  Yarbrough v. 
Protective Servs. Co., Inc., No. 2015-08-0574, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 3, 
at *11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 25, 2016).  “[P]arties should not be required 
to endure the hassle and expense of baseless litigation.  Nor should appellate courts be 
required to waste time and resources on appeals that have no realistic chance of success.”  
Id. at *10-11; see also Burnette v. WestRock, No. 2016-01-0670, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. 
App. Bd. LEXIS 66, at *18 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 31, 2017).  However, 
we exercise our discretion here not to award attorneys’ fees or other expenses for 
Employee’s frivolous appeal.  See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-22-.04(6) (2018). 
 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed, and the case is remanded.  Costs on 
appeal have been waived. 
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